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Folded Words
Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms. By W. Michael Reisman.
New York: The Free Press, 1979. Pp. 277. $12.95.
Reviewed by Sydney M. Cone IIlt
In Folded Lies,' Professor W. Michael Reisman sets forth a number
of rich and provocative thoughts about the phenomenon of bribery,
notwithstanding a rather pointless prologue and an inexcusable retreat
to cynicism. Unfortunately, faced with hard analytic problems, he
abandons the challenge for jargon, self-indulgence, and brummagem
about "the attractions of money." 2 Withal, it is a worthwhile book-
unpolished, often unfocused, yet the product of a keen and engaging
mind that, almost despite itself, provides valuable insight into the
demimonde of the bribe.
The author's point of departure is the two-tier framework within
which bribes are dispensed, received, countenanced, proscribed, and
punished.3 On one level, bribery is performed, secretly or discreetly,
in accordance with an "operational code" that "tells 'operators' when,
by whom, and how certain 'wrong' things may be done. ' '4 On another
level, however, bribery transgresses the "myth system," that is, public
ideology. Much as tension and "seamless symbiosis" exist simultaneously
between the giver and the recipient of a bribe, both tension and sym-
t Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; member of the New York, District of
Columbia, and North Carolina Bars.
I. M. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS (1979) [hereinafter cited
by page number only].
2. P. 144.
3. Professor Reisman eschews "punished" and uses "sanctioned" antithetically (and,
occasionally, correctly). Compare p. 34 (example of criminal practices in a factory that
"are sanctioned as long as they are controlled by and serve those in charge") with p. 35





biosis characterize the relationship between these two tiers-the opera-
tional code and myth system.5
These points are established by what might be called journalistic
adduction. The book abounds in illustrations of people and institutions
caught up in the dual framework of practice and mythology. Indeed,
much of the book is anecdotal, almost chatty-a retelling of incidents
that have been reported in the public press or that were unearthed in
private interviews.0 Superimposed on these illustrations is an appear-
ance of categorical structure: three kinds of bribe (transactional bribes,
variance bribes, and outright purchases); 7 two kinds of campaign against
the bribe (the crusade and the reform);" five kinds of crusade and four
characteristics of reform;9 two kinds of law that fail to achieve reform
(lex imperfecta and lex simulata);10 and two areas of relevant behavior
(the bribal zone and, inevitably, the nonbribal zone)."
For the reader trying to find and follow the analysis, this structure
is often as illusory as the jargon is pedantic. It can only be regretted
that, in the absence of disciplined editing, the writing is frequently
innocent of transition, organization, or a sense of proportion.
Proportionally more attention might have been devoted to two basic
questions. First, given the exigencies of its "myth system," why has our
society tolerated a fundamentally inconsistent and subversive "opera-
tional code"? Second, is tolerance of this code and its attendant acts of
bribery likely to continue in the future?
5. See pp. 24-25 (tension between myth system and operational code); pp. 35-36 (sym-
biotic relationship between myth system and operational code).
6. So dependent is the book on journalism that at one point, to support the proposi-
tion that legitimization of a bribery system invites the development of a new bribery
system, Professor Reisman's only citation is to a humor column by Russell Baker. F. 85
& n.38.
7. Pp. 69-93. The three categories of bribe represent increasing levels of noxiousness.
Transactional bribes "secure or accelerate the performance" of an official's "prescribed
function." P. 69. Outright purchases secure, not the performance of a particular act, but
the acquisition of an employee who appears loyal to another organization. Pp. 88-89. Pro-
fessor Reisman also postulates two types of variance bribe-the bribe that suspends the
application of a rule and the bribe that changes it-but covers his analysis by saying that
"the distinction between the two is sometimes unclear." Pp. 78-79.
8. Pp. 98-114.
9. "Crusade enforcement" may take the forms of "sound and fury," "scapegoating,"
"selecting downward," "eliminating rivals," and "human sacrifice." Pp. 105-07. Reforms
may be initiated by elites as well as by "a newly ascendant elite"; participation by "myth
custodians" such as clergymen, journalists, and teachers is critical; and the result must
be "an increasing approximation to the community's myth system .... " Pp. 111-14.
10. Lex imperfecta ("law without teeth") is designed to be imperfect, often promoting
"a planned inefficiency," and may be "subtly crafted." Pp. 29-30. Lex simulata "is a
legislative exercise that produces a statutory instrument apparently operable, but one that
neither prescribers, those charged with its administration, nor the putative target audience
ever intend to be applied." P. 31.
11. Pp. 139-40.
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Professor Reisman appears to advance two possible explanations for
the first question. One explanation turns on
a fundamental dualism of our civilization. It encompasses two
tendencies, perhaps two world views: capitalism's licit greed and
republicanism's civic altruism and disdain for the material ...
Official and personal ambivalence about bribery, like the ambiv-
alence about white-collar crime in general, relates to the incom-
patibility of capitalism and republicanism and the reluctance (if
not practical impossibility) to choose, at last, one or the other.12
Although this may be a tempting analysis, Reisman unfortunately
neither develops nor dissects it. Is bribery just a morbid capitalistic wen
on the fair form of the Republic? Were it not for capitalism, would
our everyday operational codes and our resplendent republican ideology
be as one? Surely the analysis must be pushed further, if it is not to
collapse entirely. It would be laughable to suggest (and Reisman does
not claim) that the socialist countries of the world have diminished
either bribery or extortion merely by abolishing capitalism. Notorious-
ly, the gap between legislated ideology and operational practice in some
socialist countries is enormous. Domestically, moreover, "capitalism" is
itself largely a myth system in many sectors of our economy. Thus it can
hardly be said that there is a correlation between the absence of capi-
talism and the absence of bribery. 13 In fact, there may be no correla-
tion whatsoever in our society between the presence or absence of
capitalistic elements, on the one hand, and the presence or absence of
bribery, on the other.
The second possible explanation that Professor Reisman appears to
advance for the duality of attitudes toward bribery focuses on an in-
dividual level. The human personality is seen as "a bundle of selves,
each having its own loyalty system, and the selves compete for priority
in different situations."' 4 The bribe becomes
in some personal or social contexts .... a positive operation. [It is
an] assertion of autonomy against the demand for self-subordina-
tion to some larger gToup .... [T]he insistence on a private reality
separate from that held forth to others may be an important expres-
sion of autonomy as well as an exigent modality of survival."
12. P. 122; see pp. 43-44 (comparing myth system and capitalism).
13. Do government-to-government bribes nonetheless generate less tension between
myth system and operational code than do bribes by private enterprise? See p. 152
(discussing probability that United States officials knew of, advised about, and facilitated
the massive, transnational commercial bribery that is currently under attack).
14. P. 126.
15. Pp. 126-27 & n.14.
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Although this line of analysis seems especially fruitful, it also seems
bound to lead into profound and subtle psychological questions that
are necessarily beyond the reach of an essentially jurisprudential study.
In any event, having noted that bribery is more complicated than
mere lying because "you must incorporate one other human being
when you construct a fragment of a private world with a folded lie,"'u
Reisman simply asks: "under what circumstances is it appropriate to
tender a bribe? Under what circumstance ought one to bribe?" The
answers, he says, will depend upon the "value system" of each in-
dividual. 7 The reader is then left to his own devices to translate a
multiplicity of individual value systems into a societal framework of
"myth system and operational code." Intellectually, it is all very
tantalizing, even if the reader is at a loss to explain exactly why.
And the future? As noted above, Professor Reisman distinguishes
between crusades and reform. Crusades, the preserve of people delight-
fully called "moral entrepreneurs," invoke the myth system without
materially modifying the operational code. Crusades result in lex im-
perfecta or lex simulata, in bureaucratic red tape that may create "new
incentives for bribes" and "more and more expensive bribery."' s In
contrast, reform results in an effective change in the operational code
"involving greater approximation to the myth system.... ."1 Although
he postulates the possibility of reform, Professor Reisman clearly is
thinking of himself when he writes that "anyone who studies bribery
becomes sufficiently cynical to note the proximity of bribal and non-
bribal zones, the utility of official power to all, and the attractions of
money to many." 20 Show Reisman a possible reform, and he will
demonstrate why it is a mere crusade. Show him a federal antibribery
statute, be it section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue Code or section
103 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,21 and he will prove
it to be an imperfect or simulated law.22
In this respect, the book takes on an air of unreality. The deterrent
effect of the antibribery provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act have been the subject of serious
commentary in recent years.23 It flies in the face of practical experience
16. Pp. 127-28.
17. P. 128.
18. Pp. 100, 146.
19. P. 111.
20. P. 144.
21. Pub. L. 95-213, § 103, 91 Stat. 1495 (1977), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-I (West Supp. 1980).
22. Pp. 32-33, 161-64.
23. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON QUESTION-
ABLE FORErIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS 22-23 (1977) (Internal Revenue Service "vigor-
ously carrying out" investigations; "inviting the extensive criminal and civil sanctions for
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to hold these statutes and their enforcement to so rarefied a standard
that they are dismissed for conceptual imperfection or executory simula-
tion. The threat of federal investigation and indictment has been and
remains real and will continue to inform responsible decisionmaking.
This threat constitutes an effective and substantial inhibition to brib-
ery, and it is unreasonable to imply otherwise. Admittedly, bribery is
as persistent a feature of human behavior as many other species of
venality; undoubtedly, the utility and attractiveness of economic gain
make for endless temptations to pay and receive various forms of bribe.
It does not follow, however, that any law put forward in this area, let
alone the current federal campaign against bribery, should be consigned
to the pseudoscientific dustbin of imperfecta or simu lata.
Professor Reisman seeks to rationalize his inability to discern reform
in virtually any antibribery campaign or legislation. Bribery, he says,
reflects "a pluralistic world community"; to eliminate bribery would
be to terminate an "ongoing process of individuation, group forma-
tion, and self-determination" and to replace "pluralism" with "a single,
unchallengeable authority." He ends his analysis by rhetorically asking
whether such an "authority" would be consistent with "the type of
world order and psychopersonal organization we desire?"2
4
This book tends to wax ironic whenever it touches on the practicing
lawyer in the world of bribery. Lawyers are characterized as resolving
their ambiguities "by exhorting their clients to undertake self-reform,"
thereby producing "more clandestine behavior, not less";25 as reaping
a "windfall" from "reform legislation";26 as being "silken and aristo-
cratic," while countenancing "specialist roles"; 27 as taking care not to
be consulted, at least "on the record," about bribery.2- The practicing
lawyer, it would seem, lacks a coherent point of view concerning
bribery. Yet Professor Reisman's own flirtation with outright cynicism
and his curious rationalization of the futility of reform suggest that he
himself is in the same predicament.
tax fraud is, if anything, more unpalatable"); Atkeson, The Foreign CorruPt Practices Act
of 1977, 12 INT'L LAW. 703, 720 (1978) (the Act and other federal measures constitute "the
most comprehensive and draconian controls any home country has ever applied to the
involvement of its multinational businesses in corruption abroad"). See generally Surrey,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let the Punishment fit the Crime, 20 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 293 (1979).
24. P. 149.
25. P. 52 & n.38.
26. Pp. 114-15.
27. P. 145. Professor Reisman implies that he is citing authority for the proposition
that "silken and aristocratic American law firms" pay bribes on behalf of their clients. In
fact, no such authority is cited.
28. P. 170.
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Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. By Lee C. Buchheit.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978. Pp. xi, 260.
$17.50.
Reviewed by Eisuke Suzukit
Self-determination is a double-edged concept that can act as a
unifying as well as a disintegrative force. It has proven to be the most
volatile instrument of twentieth century political movements; it invokes
and agitates a basic human desire to assert one's identity by excluding
others. Movements for self-determination occur at every level of human
association, from the nation-state to the individual.
Self-determination is the subject of a vast body of literature. Post-
World War I literature sought to establish objective criteria-including
shared culture, history, language, territory, and ethnicity-by which to
identify "nations" eligible for self-determination.' These studies proved
inapplicable to the decolonization process after World War II because
the newly independent states inherited territorial arrangements created
by metropolitan powers without regard to group characteristics. Rupert
Emerson's work, studying the process of "nation-building" as a result
of decolonization, concludes that self-determination has no further
applicability once independence is achieved. 2 Thereafter, Emerson
declares, group claims to self-determination lack legal content and
succeed only as a matter of effective power.3 In contrast, U. 0. Umo-
t Counsel, Asian Development Bank (Manila). The views expressed herein are my
own and do not reflect those of the Asian Development Bank.
I. See, e.g., A. COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 48-55 (1944) (discussion of ob-
jective elements of nationality); C. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES
4-11 (1934) (discussion of cultural concept of nationhood).
2. R. EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION 307-08 (1960); R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINA-
TION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION 64 (1964) ("What emerges beyond
dispute is that all peoples do not have the right of self-determination: they have never
had it, and they never will have it."); Emerson, Self-Determnination, 65 Am. J. INT'L
L. 459, 465 (1971) ("There can be no present assurance that the international community
will give them, or some defined portion of them, the kind of blessing which it has given
the colonial peoples.")
3. Emerson, Self-Determination, supra note 2, at 475 ("The realistic issue is still not
whether a people is qualified for and deserves the right to determine its own destiny but
whether it has the political strength, which may well mean the military force, to validate
its claim.")
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zurike believes that legitimate political units can be identified, and he
contends that their fundamental human rights must take priority over
territorial integrity.4 His study fails, however, to deal adequately with
claims for territorial separation from existing states-the most frequent
situation in which claims to self-determination are made in the post-
colonial era.
Secessionist claims invoke the right of self-determination, a peremp-
tory and fundamental norm of contemporary international law. 5 They
conflict, however, with the cardinal principle of international law,
which prohibits change in existing territorial arrangements. Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, which requires states to
refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state," embodies existing states' def-
erence to each others' bases of authoritative and effective power.7
Recognizing the conflict between these principles, Lee C. Buchheit,
in Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination,8 focuses on "the
implications for the international community of appeals to the prin-
ciple of self-determination by secessionist groups within independent
States." Seeking to preserve the legal significance of self-determination
in the post-colonial era, he has undertaken the important task of iden-
tifying legitimate separatist claims. The principle of self-determina-
tion, he declares at the outset, "must be able to accommodate the de-
mands of 'selves' who are located within an independent State but are
clearly governed without their consent." To implement the principle,
the international lawyer must provide guidelines that "may not accede
to the demands of every parochial sentiment but [will] also avoid an
uncritical affirmation of the supremacy of the 'sovereign' State."' 0
After introducing the problem, Buchheit analyzes the historical de-
velopment of the concept of self-determination in four areas: natural
law, positive international law, the practice of states, and juristic
opinion." He then considers six recent secessionist attempts-by
4. U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 195 (1972).
5. Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Ter-
ritorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779, 835-37 (1976); cf. Advisory Opinion on the
Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. 31-33 (recognizing principle of self-determination in
colonial context).
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
7. See Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1973); Suzuki, Extraconstitutional Change and World Public Order: A
Prologue to Decision-Making, 15 Hous. L. REv. 23, 68-69 (1977).
8. L. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978) [hereinafter
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Katanga, the Kurds, Biafra, the Somalis, the Nagas, and Bangladesh-
and highlights the factors that influenced the international commu-
nity's response to these claims of self-determination.'! Finally, he pro-
poses a "calculation of legitimacy," a set of policy-oriented guidelines to
be used in evaluating secessionist claims to self-determination.' 3
I. Defining the Subject: Self-Determination
"The student of .. . self-determination," declares Buchheit, "must
begin with the fact of entrenched parochial sentiment."' 14 The book's
discussion of the factors affecting group association, however, is cursory.
Buchheit refers, in the abstract, to "parochial sentiment"' on the one
hand, and "the desire for unification or integration with a wider polit-
ical or economic entity" 6 on the other, but he does not elaborate on
the nature of these competing desires or the process of interaction be-
tween them. One wonders, therefore, what Buchheit means by "a doc-
trine of self-determination," "parochialism," or "subjugation." Is "sub-
jugation" not a product of the dominant group's "parochialism"? Since
he does not clearly define his terms, the observational standpoint under-
lying his description of the factual context is unclear.
In addition, Buchheit fails to give empirical content to the concept
of self-determination; the book offers only a disappointingly short dis-
cussion of "self" definition and group formation. "[A]t a minimum,"
Buchheit suggests, "any 'self' must be distinct from the other selves
inhabiting the globe."17 He observes that "a demand for self-determina-
tion will often be deeply rooted in a wish to perpetuate the sense of
comfort and security that attends a parochial environment,"' 8 but con-
tends that distinctive selfhood cannot be established solely by a group's
subjective perception that it is reasonably distinct from its neighbors. 19
A group must also have objective characteristics-some combination of
geographical, linguistic, racial, or cultural ties-that distinguish it from
the ambient population.20 Without discussing the applicability of these
criteria to specific situations, Buchheit continues: "[a]ssuming that one
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what sorts of activities constitute legitimate instances of 'determin-
ing.' "21 He thus ignores recent work in the fields of group psychology,
sociology, and political science and misses important insights into the
subjective basis of group identification.22 His work on "legitimacy"
therefore rests on an inadequate understanding of the nature of de-
mands for self-determination.
Buchheit emphasizes the external circumstances of claims to self-
determination rather than the internal factors that stimulate the claims.
"The moral appeal of the principle [of self-determination]," he writes,
"seems to arise from a recognition of the harsh treatment and exploita-
tion that have historically been the fate of groups ruled by an 'alien'
people."23 As a result, he arrives at the curious conclusion that "[i]f
history were a chronicle of the voluntary association and dissociation of
human groups, there would be no need for a doctrine of self-determina-
tion."24
Yet the "doctrine of self-determination," though volatile and often
divisive, operates not only at times of social unrest or subjection to
"harsh treatment and exploitation," 2 3 but also in the course of orderly
performance of government. In each case, the protection of and respect
for the individual's freedom of choice-the precondition for group
formation-is a matter of fundamental concern.2 The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights provides that free, universal suffrage-the "will
of the people"-is the basis of the authority of government.27 In addi-
tion, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States emphasizes the close
nexus between the fulfillment of self-determination of a group within
the state and the territorial integrity of the state.28 Thus, the in-
21. P. 11.




26. E. Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to
Group Formation 14-35 (1974) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, Yale Law School); see McDougal,
Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and
World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 919, 938-43 (1975).
27. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 21(3) of the Declaration
provides that "[tihe will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting pro-
cedures." Id. at 75.
28. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (re-
fusing to recognize or encourage "any action which would dismember or impair, totally
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dividual's exercise of free choice through participation in the power
process is an empirical foundation for the right to self-determination, 29
a foundation that Buchheit fails to explore.
In addition to the declarations of the United Nations, the work of
social scientists also establishes the central importance of the individual
in a study of self-determination. Individual demands, expectations, and
choices constitute the fundamental basis of group association. Basic
human needs30 may be met individually or through membership in a
group-a family, an ethnic group, a territorially based group, a body
politic, or another association.31 Individuals and groups seeking to ful-
fill their needs face the tension between preserving their own exclusive
identity and developing a more inclusive identification with a larger
aggregation of persons. Identification as part of a larger grouping,
which is an inherent part of the process of group formation, occurs
when previously separate individuals or groups perceive that they share
common demands and that these demands can most effectively be
realized through association. In addition, the broader grouping must
provide symbols that both accommodate the competing identities of
various members32 and organize their common demands. 33 Self-de-
termination is exercised in the choice of whether or not to identify
with a larger group. Yet, once admitted to a group, the new member is
expected to conform to group norms and behavioral patterns if he
wishes to remain a member.34
The formation of a body politic-a highly organized, territorially
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-de-
termination of peoples").
29. See Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WoLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. McDOUGAL 198, 199 (W. Reisman & B.
Weston eds. 1976) (principle of self-determination deeply rooted in notion of human
dignity and human rights).
30. Every human being harbors biologically based needs "for life, for safety and
security, for belongingness and affection, for respect and self-respect, and for self-
actualization." A. MASLoW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 3 (1968).
31. R. MACIVER, COMMUNITY: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 23 (3d ed. 1924).
32. See Lasswell, Future Systems of Identity in the World Community, in 4 THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
33. Cf. H. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 75-93 (1935) (use of
symbols to organize demand for security during war crisis); K. MANNHEIM, MAN AND
SocIm' IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 133-38 (rev. ed. 1940) (importance of symbols for
group integration).
34. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 308 (rev. ed. 1968). One technique
of maintaining group integrity is by reference to those external to the group, that is,
through out-group pressure. See generally L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT
(1956).
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based political association-illustrates these processes. 35 The emergence
of a recurrent pattern of thought and behavior, subjectively uniting a
significant number of the inhabitants of a given community into a
group, may lead to the creation of a "protostate" territorial association
to pursue common goals. 30 If appropriate constitutional means are un-
available, the group may claim the right to use extra-constitutional
means to create a power base. Yet, after seizing power, effective elites
will then use the principle of inviolability of the state organization to
safeguard their power base against those potentially following the same
path to power. 37 So long as a significant number of people expect that
membership in the group will improve their condition, they will
recognize control by the territorial elite as legitimate. 3
If a subgroup's expectations of institutions change, however, its per-
ceptions of its own interests may come to diverge from those of the
larger group, and it may cease to regard the ruling elite's control as
legitimate. The subgroup may then commence a new process of group
formation, 9 aiming to form a territorial association and at the same
time seeking dissociation from the existing territorial organization. By
creating new social institutions, the group becomes a protostate. The
subgroup's claim to the right to exercise extra-constitutional means is
a demand against the body politic, not within it. In such a situation,
it is futile to argue at length about the legality or illegality of a
separatist movement in terms of the "limited constitutional" frame-
work of a body politic. 40 Yet the ruling elite, in apparent disregard of
its earlier assumption of power by a similar process, labels the separa-
tion as rebellious or treasonous; it resorts to violence, which it views as
its legitimate and exclusive prerogative, to suppress the separation. The
subgroup, in turn, uses violent means to protect its security. "Violence,"
in the words of one commentator, "is the essential cutting edge that
creates and maintains ecological separation between integrated social
organizations." '41 In the dynamic continuum of group formation and
dissociation, the principle of self-determination used to justify the
formation of a new state is complementary to the principles of "political
35. For a discussion of a body politic as a temporal phenomenon of group dynamics,
see Suzuki, supra note 5, at 785-89.
36. H. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 240-46 (1930).
37. Reisman, supra note 7, at 30 n.76.
38. Cf. MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 341 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954)
(political association's power rests on members' belief in legitimacy of communal action).
See generally H. LASSWELL, supra note 36, at 240-46 (subjective basis of existence of state).
39. See M. WEBER, supra note 38, at 342-48 (describing formation and evolution of
political-territorial association).
40. Suzuki, supra note 7, at 36-40.
41. H. NIEBURG, POLITICAL VIOLENCE 100 (1969).
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independence" and "territorial integrity" used to protect the existence
of the state thus established. 42
Buchheit fails to take account of these insights of the social sciences.
Therefore, his study of secession is incomplete and his understanding
of self-determination is inadequate.
II. Sources of Law
Moreover, the book suffers from a narrow view of the sources of
international law. Buchheit, a member of the analytical, positivist
school of international law, assumes that the agreement of states-in
the form of "first principles" or specific international judgments-is
the only source of valid international law. By explicit or implicit con-
sensus, he asserts, states accept "certain behavioral norms which, by
virtue of their fundamental nature, are intended to be the first prin-
ciples of civilized international conduct." 43 Typically, these "first
principles" impose "normative constraints" and "seek to prevent or
limit undesirable international conduct." 44
Not only is Buchheit oblivious to another important aspect of law-
as an affirmative instrument of the social process-but he also equates
the mere verbalization of rules with actual operations. Yet even when
these "norms" fail "to command strict adherence in the behavior of
States," he contends nevertheless that such norms "represent some
consensus concerning what ought to happen which must be regarded
as more than a precatory suggestion."4 He asks the reader to accept
"as a matter of faith" the proposition that, in the absence of the
promulgation of such norms, more undesirable international conduct
would have occurred. 40 As analyticalists characteristically do, Buchheit
rationalizes the discrepancy between perspectives and operations T by
explaining that these norms evolved "to meet the evasive ingenuities
of international policy advisors."48
Not surprisingly, the analytical approach fails to provide Buchheit
with any guidelines as to the legitimacy of specific attempts by gToups




46. Id. Curiously enough, though he is an analyticalist with a positivist view of
law, Buchheit considers stch norms "peremptory norms" backed by "a faith," pp. 31-32,
as if he were a naturalist.
47. "Perspectives" are the subjectivi ties that affect choice; "operations" are the choices
actually made. McDotgal, Lasswell, & Reisman, Theories About International Law:
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 202 (1968).
48. P. 31.
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to secede from territorial states. Buchheit recognizes that the United
Nations Charter, human rights covenants, and other General Assembly
declarations set forth conflicting "first principles" that can be applied
to contested claims to self-determination-the principle prohibiting the
use of force, the principle of nonintervention, and the principle of the
equal rights and self-determination of peoples .49 Because of the "extra-
ordinarily vague content of self-determination," Buchheit is pessimistic
about the ability of "either international jurists or international poli-
ticians" to formulate "any clear delimitation in the foreseeable fn-
ture." 0 He emphasizes that "the extension of the principle to con-
cepts of economic and cultural self-determination ... portends an even
further encroachment of the principle onto ground formerly con-
sidered the domain of other norms such as nonintervention and the
proscription of force."' 1 In the absence of detailed hierarchical positive
norms, therefore, he warns that states are left free to make subjective
choices among "alternative 'first principles' of international conduct.
The preference of one norm over another by a given State at a given
time can therefore be dictated by simple political expediency with rela-
tive legal impunity. '"2 Alas, the analytical model that relies heavily on
the syntactic harmony and autonomy of rules has precluded Buchheit
from clarifying explicitly the policy contents of such norms. Swamped
in verbal formulae, which by themselves do not form a hierarchical
ordering, he is too confused to distinguish factual events taking place
from a series of legal consequences flowing therefrom.53 He fails to
recognize that events give rise to legal consequences only when norms
are applied by an authoritative decisionmaker.
Obliquely, Buchheit acknowledges the presence of community mem-
bers' expectations about authority, on the basis of which a certain
gToup's claim to self-determination may be considered "illeoitimate." 4
He asserts, however, that unless there is "an international judgment
regarding the legitimacy" 5 of a particular claim, the efficacy of norms
is seriously impaired. Buchheit is unable to ascertain a dynamic flow
of authoritative communications that constitute authoritative and con-




53. The actions of states do not themselves imply legal consequences; a claim is not
synonymous with an authoritative decision. See p. 1255 infra. For a discussion of the
concept of "normatihe-ambiguity," see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, in STUIEaS IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDLR




Vol. 89: 1247, 1980
Self-Determination
trolling decisions.50 He relinquishes his own task as an international
lawyer, stating:
Under the present legal order, however, there is no clear basis in
law for criticizing an intervenor's subjective decision regarding the
legitimacy of a group's claim to self-determination or for criticizing
its judgment in giving priority in its normative hierarchy to the
principle of self-determination over nonintervention and the pro-
hibition of force.57
By implication, any decisions other than those of international collec-
tive organs are reduced to being subjective5" and hence undesirable.
Buchheit fails to recognize that the subjectivity of a decisionmaker is
an essential component of decisionmaking. Unpersuaded by con-
temporary studies in self-determination questions, "the more fruitful
approach," he suggests, is "an attempt at removing the open-ended sub-
jectivity involved in unilateral determinations of 'legitimacy.' .59 Thus,
he naively proposes a new set of sub-norms to "delimit the scope of
'legitimate' self-determination, thereby reducing the number of in-
stances of permissible deviation" from the two principles of nonin-
tervention and the prohibition of force. °
Apparently, it never dawns on Buchheit that an instance of legiti-
mate self-determination is a decision blessed with authoritative sanc-
tions."' Because he believes that hierarchical norms have autonomous
existence, he erroneously considers that the claimant creates value
consequences by invoking a norm in a particular instance. But plainly,
legitimacy cannot be provided merely by rules, however detailed and
refined, that are read, interpreted, and applied in context by flesh-and-
blood decisionmakers purposefully to affect the distribution of values. 62
To establish legitimacy, authoritative decisionmakers must pronounce
a given instance as legitimate in creating value consequences. To do so,
56. An "authoritative decision" is "a continuous flow of decisions made from perspec-
tihes of authority-that is, made by the people who are expected to make them, in
accordance with community expectations about how they should be made, in established
structures of authority, and by authorized procedures." McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman,
supra note 47, at 201. Authoritative decision combines elements of both authority and
control. Id. at 200. It is not limited to decisions made by highly organized institutional
structures. Id. at 201-02.
57. P. 37 (emphasis added).
58. Pp. 37, 42.
59. P. 42.
60. Id.
61. See note 56 supra.
62. A relevant jurisprudence must "distinguish between effective decisions which are
taken by sheer naked power, or calculations of expediency, and those which are taken
from perspectives of authority." McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 47, at 201.
1255
The Yale Law Journal
the decisionmakers must be equipped with a more comprehensive in-
tellectual approach than that which Buchheit proposes.
III. Analysis of Historical Trends
Buchheit surveys past trends in theories of law and in decisions about
self-determination. He rejects the natural law doctrine of resistance as
a basis for self-determination, arguing that it supplies an "insecure
jurisprudential foundation for a purported legal right" to self-de-
termination.63 He insists that the individualistic natural law doctrine
would lead to "dismemberment of society into clans, atomic families,
or individuals"6 4 and that it would result in "an unavoidable conflict
with the equally 'fundamental' rights of established Stat~s."65 Thus,
Buchheit contends that the natural law doctrine of resistance has no
theoretical nexus with the principle of self-determination by means of
territorial separation.66 One is disappointed by his imposition of analyt-
icalism over the right of resistance-a fundamental, metaphysical doc-
trine that purports to transcend the secular authority of states . 7
Buchheit believes that self-determination is a group right, not an
individual right.68 His rejection of an individualist approach to self-
determination is difficult to reconcile with the General Assembly's
inclusion of the right to self-determination in both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. ° Buchheit also fails to
acknowledge the logical nexus between the "group" right of self-de-
termination and the individual's rights of association, assembly, and
freedom of choice by participation in the power process,70 and he
ignores the centrality of individual needs in the process of group
identification.7 1
63. P. 56.
64. P. 51. But cf. J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 230 (Everyman's Lib. ed. 1924)
(recognition of natural law right to resist will not lead to instability because people are
averse to change).
65. P. 57.
66. E.g., pp. 55-56.
67. See, e.g., H. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849).
68. Pp. 50-51.
69. Article 1 of each Covenant provides: "All peoples hae the right of self-determina-
tion. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, id. at 49. Al-
though Buchheit explains that this provision was included because "[t]he felt need for a
strong, sweeping statement of the right to self-determination as a weapon against
colonialism overcame the implorations of the Western powers for cautious draftsmanship,"
p. 84, the outcome conflicts with his interpretation of self-determination.
70. See pp. 1250-51 supra.
71. See notes 31-33 sutra.
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Nevertheless, Buchheit does acknowledge that international law
recognizes the right of secession. Analyzing the development of inter-
national perspectives since the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Buch-
heit concludes that "the evolution of an international legal recognition
of secessionist self-determination, although cautious and uniformly
conservative, is nevertheless perceptible."7' Thus, he rejects the con-
tention advanced by some writers that the "fundamental principle" of
"territorial integrity" precludes any right to secession and that the right
to self-determination is limited to the context of decolonization. 73 He
maintains, however, that the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations "does not give an unlimited recognition to separa-
tism," 7 4 because, he reasons, its language reaffirms the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of states and fails to recognize ter-
ritorial separation unless the state fails "to provide a democratic govern-
ment and protection for basic human rights.' 73 One is puzzled by his
obsessive concern with the "limitation" or "qualification" of the prin-
ciple of self-determination throughout the book. Concerned with
stability and order, he seeks first to formulate a "limited and qualified"
right, and then to ensure the stability of expectations by applying the
already "fixed" and prequalified right in a predetermined manner.7 6
IV. Proposed Standards of Legitimacy
To reduce the "open-ended subjectivity involved in unilateral de-
terminations of 'legitimacy' " 7 7-a subjectivity that he attributes to the
current absence of positive norms-Buchheit seeks to identify a set of
new principles that would distinguish between legitimate and illegiti-
mate movements for self-determination. He argues that such principles
should have "predictive value"78 so that they can influence the conduct
of both groups and states and thus reduce the number of instances of
72. P. 97. Buchheit bases his conclusion on the Declaration on Friendly Relations,
supra note 28, at 124. Buchheit acknowledges that this language "seems to recognize,
for the first time in an international document of this kind, the legitimacy of secession
under certain circumstances." P. 92.
73. See Emerson, Self-Delerinination, %upra note 2, at 464-65. Emerson's thesis relies
heavily on Article 6 of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial
countries and peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, 67, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960) ("Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.")
74. P. 94.
75. Id.
76. See pp. 217-18.
77. P. 42.
78. Pp. 45, 219.
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permissible deviation from the two principles of nonintervention and
the prohibition of force.7 0
Buchheit bases his proposed standards on a conservative, static view
of the goals of the world community. As an analyticalist, he purports
to "derive" goals from existing norms rather than openly postulating
goals as expressions of his own preferences. Thus, he identifies the
following substantive goals from the preamble of the United Nations
Charter: (1) preservation of the world order against future wars; (2)
promotion of social progTess; (3) affirmation of human rights and
human dignity; and (4) international cooperative actions to achieve
these goals.8 0 From these goals, Buchheit derives the first principles of a
"maximization of international harmony" and a "minimization of in-
dividual human suffering," also articulated as "the goal of promoting
minimum conditions for individual and social development within
States."8' He recommends that, "[t]o remain faithful to its first prin-
ciples, the community must obviously balance these conflicting in-
terests. What is significant here, however, is that this balancing must
be carried on from a utilitarian viewpoint-albeit perhaps a utili-
tarianism with a basically conservative (State-centered) prejudice." '
Community interests can optimally be achieved, Buchheit asserts, by
applying his proposed "calculation of legitimacy" to secessionist claims
to self-determination. He argues that the "internal merits of the claim"
must be balanced against the "disruption factor."' 3 The "internal
merits," according to Buchheit, encompass the degree of distinctness
and cohesion of the group, as well as the viability of the proposed seces-
sionist territory as a separate state.8 4 The "disruption factor" weighs
the disruption in "world harmony" resulting from separation, includ-
ing the economic and strategic impact on the remaining state, against
the disruption resulting from continued inclusion in the larger state,
including continued oppression and violence.8 5
Both elements in Buchheit's "calculus of legitimacy" must be
analyzed in terms of the entire social process. Buchheit fails to articulate
all of the relevant factors, which include the following: who demands
separation from whom; the relationship within the claimant group
between the elite and the rank-and-file; the claimant's demands, iden-
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the geographical consequences of the claim; the manner-coercive or
persuasive-in which the claim is presented; and the effect of various
outcomes on the public order of the world community.8, Buchheit's
second factor may also place excessive emphasis on the stability of ter-
ritorial boundaries.
In addition, Buchheit fails to integrate his own future-oriented
proposals for "standards of legitimacy" with his positivist legal stand-
point. He considers the concept of "remedial secession"-secession only
as a last resort-to be the lex lata87 and does not convincingly explain
how he expects the international legal system to implement his pro-
posals. Buchheit recommends only that the proposed standards be pub-
lished by the international community.88
Finally, Buchheit's proposals are limited to legal prescriptions to be
applied after claims to self-determination have been made. This ex
post facto response excludes alternative strategies for rectifying the
predispositional and environmental conditions that may account for
recurring, intense claims to self-determination. Nevertheless, Buch-
heit optimistically hopes that, by adopting his formula, the world
community will be able to "impose a reasoned, predictable order upon
so dangerous an area of societal and international discord."8' 9
Buchheit's book makes a useful contribution to the literature on
secession from the analytical viewpoint. His discussion of the historical
development of the right to self-determination ° is extensively re-
searched, although it focuses on ideas without relating them to the
contemporary events that influenced their evolution. The case studies
provide an effective examination of the secessionist attempt in the
Congo9' and an illuminating contrast between the Congo and Biafra 2
Buchheit courageously launches a frontal attack on the prevailing mis-
conception that claims for territorial separation are illegitimate under
international law. Unfortunately, he ignores the dynamics of gToup
formation, takes a narrow analyticalist approach to the question of
legitimacy, and proposes excessively static, state-centered standards for
testing future claims to self-determination. The book cannot be treated
as the final word on secessionist self-determination.
86. See Suzuki, supra note 5, at 790-97.
87. P. 222.
88. P. 245. But this seems unduly optimistic in light of his earlier remarks on the
vagueness of self-determination and current attempts to extend it to the cultural and
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